






























THE IMPACTS OF VARIOUS TAXES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT  
 




Previous work on the effect of taxes on foreign direct investment (FDI) focused 
primarily on capital income taxes.  We investigate the proposition that other forms of taxation 
may also deter FDI. We use tax ratios, i.e., average effective tax rates, on consumption, labor and 
capital income for a panel of 25 OECD countries from 1975-2006. We find that increases in 
relative tax rates on capital income encourage net FDI outflow whereas increases in labor income 
tax rates have the opposite effect. Increases in relative consumption tax rates have insignificant 
impacts.   
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THE IMPACTS OF VARIOUS TAXES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT  
 
Tax policy typically emerges as one of the leading points in a discussion of factors 
that can either attract or drive away foreign direct investment (FDI). However, most previous 
studies of tax impact on FDI are concerned with taxes levied on corporations or on capital 
income.  Less attention has been paid to other types of taxes, such as those exacted on workers or 
consumers. However, it is possible that other taxes have an influence on FDI as well. Taxes on 
labor income and consumption impact the return on work effort. While labor supply may be 
inelastic in the short run, so that tax incidence falls on workers, in the longer run labor supply 
elasticity is higher. If so, labor income and consumption taxes raise wage costs to employers. 
High wage costs could cause domestic firms to substitute capital for labor, thus reducing their 
funds for investment abroad. On the other hand, an economy with high wages costs may 
experience outflows of investment funds as corporations outsource their production.  
In a previous study, Beck and Coskuner (2007) found that taxes impact relative 
price, i.e., the real exchange rate, in the direction indicated by theory. A follow-up study found 
that export volumes respond to price changes caused by tax changes (Beck and Chaves, 2011). 
However, financial flows induced by tax changes may offset their effect on exports.  The 
objective of this paper is to determine the extent to which this true for three types of taxes: 
consumption, labor income and capital income. We find that the impact of increased capital 
income tax rates on export volume is partly offset by the investment outflows they induce. The 
impact of increased labor income tax rates is significantly negative, suggesting that the capital 
substitution effect dominates the outsourcing effect. The impact of increased consumption taxes 
is insignificant. Moreover, our estimates of the impact of capital income tax changes is larger 
than that found elsewhere in the literature when labor income and consumption tax changes are 





I.  Previous Literature  
Previous literature has established a relationship between FDI and one category of 
taxes: capital income taxes. De Mooij and Ederveen (2003; 2008) provide useful overviews. 
After removing outliers, they calculate a mean value tax elasticity of -3.3, suggesting that a 1 
percent reduction in the host country rate of tax on capital would increase total FDI inflows by 
3.3 percent. Studies of the impacts of other forms of taxation on FDI are scarce. Egger and 
Radulescu (2008) examine labor tax impacts on the location of foreign subsidiaries and find that 
both the capital income tax rate and the constructed labor income tax rate have a negative 
relationship to the prevalence of subsidiaries or branches of foreign owned corporations. Deasi, 
et al. (2004) also find evidence that indirect taxes (taxes other than payroll and corporate income 
taxes) depress FDI. However, their study does not distinguish between taxes on capital, labor and 
consumption as ours does.  
 
II.  Model Specification 
We use a gravity model specification to model bilateral FDI outflows, based upon their 
success elsewhere in the literature (e.g., Eaton and Tamura, 1994; Razin, et al., 2002; Bénassy-
Quéré et al., 2001).  Although the theoretical foundation of the gravity model of FDI is not as 
fully developed as it is for trade (by, e.g., Bergstrand, 1985; 1989), there is justification for using 
a gravity model to represent horizontal FDI.  Most studies that have tested the relationship 
between FDI and trade support this idea (Brainard, 1993; Eaton and Tamura, 1994; Ramkishen 
and Reinert, 2008).  
The specification used here is: 
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Where        is the value of real foreign direct investment flowing from country i to 
country j in year t, 	GDP  
	  is the real gross domestic product of exporting country i in year t, 
	GDP   is the GDP of importing country j in year t,            is the physical distance between 
countries i and j, 	Adjacent   is a dummy variable that is equal to unity if countries i and j share a 
physical border,  	PPI   is the producer price index of country i in year t,        is the producer 
price index of country j in year t, and      is the real exchange rate between countries i and j, 
expressed as the value of one unit of country i’s currency in terms of country j’s currency in year 
t.   This specification is comparable to the gravity model of FDI elsewhere in the literature (e.g., 
Brouwer et al, 2008)   
Previous research has found that there are several control variables that are strongly 
correlated with the dependent variable and are therefore traditionally included in gravity models.  
The first of these is a control for any preferential trading agreements.             is a matrix of 
dummy variables equal to unity in year t when countries i and j are both members of a trade 
organization.
1 These trade agreements include agreements on the flow of capital and they have 
been shown to significantly impact capital flows (Sarisoy Guerin, 2006).  A dummy variable that 
indicates whether countries i and j share a common language as their majority language, 
          , is included.  Third, to capture the effects of fluctuations in real GDP of countries i 
and j,         	        and         	        are included.  These variables are equal to real 
GDP in year t divided by the average of real GDP for countries i and j during the previous 10 
years (as in, e.g., Beck and Coskuner, 2007). 
Tax effects are measured by the last term, TAX, which denotes a vector containing 
lags of the three tax variables examined in this study. The tax variables are tax differentials, 
defined as the difference between the exporting and the importing countries’ tax rates.  Tax rates 
                                                            
1 This includes the European Economic Community (EEC) and European Union, the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the 




include      , which is the difference between consumption tax rates levied by countries i and j 
in year t,      , for the difference in labor income tax rates and      , for the difference in capital 
income tax rates.  We hypothesize that an increase in the capital income tax rate differential will 
increase foreign direct investment outflows so we expect the coefficients of       and its lags to 
be positive. Labor income taxes and consumption taxes represent taxes on work effort. There are 
two possible responses by producers to increases in these taxes. One is to move production 
overseas in search of lower labor costs, thus increasing foreign direct investment outflows. The 
other is to divert funds toward domestic operations in order to reduce labor costs by increasing 
capital intensity, thus reducing investment outflows. Hence, the coefficients of       and of       
and their lags could have either sign. 
In order to capture the cumulative impact of the tax, each specification uses eight 
lags of the respective tax variable.  We choose eight years as the maximum for the long-term lag 
based on the observation that the t-statistics of tax ratios lagged up to eight years were 
statistically significant whereas they were insignificant beyond eight years in the vast majority of 
models tested.   
 
III.  Data 
Three methods of calculating tax rates have been used in the literature: statutory tax rates, 
tax ratios, i.e., average effective tax rates (AETRs), and marginal effective tax rates (METRs) 
(Hajkova et al., 2006; de Mooij and Ederveen, 2008).  Statutory tax rates have been widely 
viewed as unsatisfactory compared to AETRs (e.g., Egger and Radulescu, 2008; Hajkova, 2006; 
Wolff, 2007; de Mooij and Ederveen, 2008). METRs are computed for hypothetical cases and 
therefore take into account firms’ expectations of tax burdens.
2 However, the advantage of tax 
ratios is that they provide data on taxes actually paid, and so incorporate firms’ tax minimizing 
                                                            
2 Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2001) use several measures including tax ratios and METRs. All four measures of capital 
income taxes are shown to have significant impacts. Papers that have used tax ratios to calculate the tax rate at the 
microeconomic level are Altshuler and Newlon, (1993),  Büttner (2001) and Stowhase (2002). In their survey De 




strategies. Although they are far from perfect, they are reasonable proxies for marginal tax rates 
and therefore, they are used here. We describe these data further below as well as our extensions.  
Tax Rates 
Mendoza et al. (1994) first calculated tax ratios for the G-7 countries between 1965 
and 1988.
4  Carey and Rabesona (2002) updated these tax ratio data to include 25 countries 
between 1975 and 2000 using the SNA93 National Accounts data.  We use their methods, 
described in Cary and Tchilinguirian (2000), to extend the tax ratio data to include 25 OECD 
countries between 1975 and 2006.  To construct the tax ratios, tax revenue data published by the 
OECD are divided into components which are levied on consumption, labor, and capital.  These 
revenues form the numerators of the tax ratios.  The denominators are formed by the base on 
which each of these taxes were levied and are determined by using each country’s national 
accounts data.
5  Tables 1-3 contain descriptive statistics of our updated tax ratio dataset.
6  
Foreign Direct Investment 
Foreign direct investment data are obtained from the Foreign Direct Investment 
Statistics published by the OECD.stat database.  These data are an unbalanced panel of annual 
data containing FDI outward flows between each pair of countries included in this study in 
nominal US dollars for 1985 through 2006.  These data are converted to real US dollar values 
using the OECD’s annual exchange rates and gross total fixed capital formation deflators.  
Included in the measure of FDI are earnings from investments by foreign entities that are 
retained by some part of the parent organization and transfers of funds from the parent 
organization to its foreign entities (either in the form of debt or equity). These data also include 
purchases of existing assets and exclude investment funds that are obtained in the host country or 
from a third country, hence they are not a perfect measure of foreign direct investment. 
                                                            
4 Volkerink and de Haan (2000) provide an organized and thorough overview of the literature on tax ratio 
computations alongside of their own calculations of  Mendoza, et al. (1997)’s. 
5 A detailed description of these calculations can be found in an Appendix supplied upon request. 
6 Slight discrepancies with Carey and Rabesona (2002) where our data overlap can be attributed to slightly different 




Nevertheless, they are close proxies and, as such, are often used to represent international 
investment flows.   
Other Explanatory Variables 
Most additional data were obtained from the OECD.stat database, with a few 
exceptions.      is real annual GDP obtained from the OECD national accounts.           is a 
variable which estimates the physical distance between the two most populous cities for any two 
country pairs.  Listings for membership in trade organization were found on the WTO website 
and the WTO Regional Trade Agreements Information System.  The real exchange rate,      was 
calculated using the nominal exchange rate from the OECD’s Reference Series for Revenue 
Statistics and was adjusted using the exporter and importer producer price index as suggested by 
Chinn (2006) in the following way:  
             	        	        
    
     
  
     is the industrial producer price index obtained from the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics Database with missing values in some cases filled in using OECD.stat.  This measure 
of the price level is based on the revenue received by producers of goods and services so it is free 
from sales and excise taxes that are included in other measures of the price level such as the 
consumer price index.   
 
IV.  Estimation 
The proper specification of a panel gravity model is one that contains exporter and 
importer country fixed effects, time fixed effects, as well as time-invariant bilateral effects 
(Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2003). However, including fixed bilateral effects means that several 
time-invariant parameters familiar to gravity models cannot be included in the specification, 
including distance, adjacency, whether the countries share a common language, shared 
membership in some long-standing trade agreements, etc.  According to Egger and Pfaffermayr 




option.  However, to ensure that it is the best option in this particular model, we follow Egger 
and Pfaffermayr and empirically test whether including fixed effects is superior to the set of 
time-invariant bilateral variables mentioned above. We compare three versions of our baseline 
gravity model in Table 4.  The first model in column 1 includes fixed effects for each country 
pair and contains no time-invariant bilateral terms. The second model in column 2 is ordinary 
least squares (OLS) that also excludes time-invariant bilateral terms and contains only main 
country fixed effects, which are essentially two sets of dummy variables:  one for exporting (i) 
country and one for importing (j) country. The third model in column 3 also includes main 
country fixed effects and is identical to the second but adds in the time-invariant bilateral terms 
of distance, adjacency, language and a dummy variable for membership in the European Trade 
Association (the only time-invariant trade agreement used in the baseline specification).  The 
results of several Wald tests lead to the conclusion that the bilateral fixed effects model is the 
superior model of these three, as it was in Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003).   
In a subsequent paper, Egger (2005) suggests additional criteria to use to determine 
whether a fixed effects model is appropriate.
7  Following Egger, we first perform a Hausman test 
which results in a highly significant χ
2 statistic, indicating that the fixed effects model is 
consistent while the random effects model is inconsistent.  Second, we perform a Wald test that 
results in a rejection of the null hypothesis that the set of bilateral fixed effects is equal to zero.
8  
Third, we determine that a fixed effects model is preferred over a Hausman-Taylor model by 
testing whether the instruments, or the exogenous variables in the model, are uncorrelated with 
the error term using a Hausman-Taylor over-identification test of the following specification: 
                                                            
7 Under Egger’s criteria, the fixed effects model is appropriate if: (i) the Hausman test rejects the random effects 
model, (ii) “at least one of the tests of zero exporter and zero importer fixed effects rejects zero” and (iii) the H-T 
over-identification test rejects (the null hypothesis of which states that the instruments, or the exogenous variables in 
the model, are uncorrelated with the error term).  Our fixed effects model differs slightly from that of Egger in that a 
full set of bilateral fixed effects is used rather than just fixed effects for exporter and importer countries per the 
conclusions following Egger and Pfaffermeyer (2003). 
8 This fixed effects model differs from that of Egger in that a full set of bilateral fixed effects is used rather than just 
fixed effects for exporter and importer countries.  This is per the conclusions following Egger and Pfaffermeyer 
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Where the endogenous variables are      
	 ,       
	 ,         	       ,         	       , and in 
some specifications, also any of the tax ratios.  The remaining variables are classified as 
exogenous and as such, in the H-T model they are used as instruments in order to calculate 
values for the endogenous variables.  The over-identification tests reject the null hypothesis that 
the extra instruments are uncorrelated with the error term (column 4 of Table 4). Therefore, the 
fixed effects model is appropriate in this case. 
Time Effects   
  Following Egger (2000), time effects are tested in this model.  The results of 
likelihood ratio tests performed on each of the three models described above appear in Table 4.  
These results show that the χ
2 statistic is highly significant in all three cases—indicating that the 
null hypothesis of restricting the year effects to zero is rejected.  Therefore, time effects are 
included in this model although not reported in the following tables.  
Endogeneity 
There is reason to believe that the dependent variable, FDI in year t, could influence 
some of the independent variables in year t.  For example, a large increase in FDI from country i 
in year t could lead to a significant increase in GDP of country j.  To deal with the issue of 
endogeneity in the specification, Mendoza et. al. (1997) and Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2001) lagged 
all of the time-varying independent variables; we follow this practice as well. Theoretically this 
is justified since these variables are likely to affect FDI outflow with a delay.  There is also likely 
to be a significant lag in the relationship between the exchange rate and FDI. To determine the 
appropriate lag of the exchange rate, we used the baseline model below and compared the same 
specification with the exchange rate lagged 1, 2 and 3 years.  The value of the exchange rate 
lagged one year had the highest level of significance based on the t-statistic and thus we chose to 





Tax ratios are possibly correlated with real GDP because they are constructed using 
a portion of GDP as the tax base.
9  Mendoza et al. (1997) use a lagged value of tax ratios as 
instruments in order to avoid this issue.  Because the time-variant terms have already been 
lagged in order to avoid concerns over endogeneity, following this solution would require that 
the tax ratios be lagged by two time periods if it was determined that the multicollinearity 
between taxes and GDP was of significant magnitude.  This is avoided, however, because 
analysis of the data shows that although there is significant correlation between GDP and the tax 
ratios, the impact that this correlation has on the estimates from the model appear to be 
minimal.
10   
Tax ratios themselves maybe collinear, i.e., either positively or negatively correlated.  
The positive correlation would result if a government decided to use an expansionary or 
contractionary policy and thereby decreased or increased all types of taxes.  A negative 
correlation would result from a government attempting to shift the tax burden from one base to 
another if minimum revenue is desired.  Analysis of the data shows that either of these 
explanations is plausible for different countries.  Countries that have positively correlated labor 
and capital tax ratios, which are each negatively correlated with the consumption tax ratio, 
include: Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal and the US.  
Countries for which all three tax ratios are positively correlated include: Australia, Finland, 
Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Slovak 
Republic, Spain and Sweden.  Further robustness checks were performed.  These involve 
comparing estimates when one or more tax variables is removed or when small portions of data 
are removed.  The overall conclusions regarding sign and significance are unchanged with two 
                                                            
9 This problem does not seem to be a concern to those who have used both tax ratios and a measure of GDP as 
explanatory variables within the same equation, such as Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2001). 
10 The analysis involved the comparison of several versions of the basic model each including combinations of tax 
ratios lagged by between one and ten years.   Based on the fact that the t-statistics of the GDP and tax ratio 
coefficients and the R
2 value were little changed by these variations, there is little evidence that correlation between 




exceptions. The cumulative impact of an increase in the labor income tax variable is significantly 
negative when either the capital income tax variable is included or a measure of the overall tax 
burden is included, whereas it is insignificant alone. Also, the cumulative impact of capital 
income taxes is always significantly positive whether included singly or together, but the 
magnitude is greater when labor income tax rates are controlled for. Since our results along with 
those in previous studies indicate that the capital income tax variable is significant, we concluded 
that the specification which includes all three tax variables is most appropriate.  Table 5 provides 
estimates when tax ratios included singly and together.
11 Later tables include all three tax ratios.    
Heteroskedasticity 
The main specification for the gravity model is also tested for the presence of 
heteroskedasticity by calculating a modified Wald statistic for groupwise heteroskedasticity in 
the residuals of the fixed effect regression models.  In all three cases, the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity is rejected.  As a result, all of the estimations included in this research are 
reported with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. 
Serial Correlation   
The specification was tested for evidence of first order serial correlation in the 
residuals of the heteroskedasticity-robust fixed effect regression models.  Without serial 
correlation present, the residuals from the regression of the first-differenced variables should 
have an autocorrelation of -0.5 (Wooldridge, 2002).  To determine whether this is the case, we 
use a Wald test of whether in a regression of the lagged residuals on the current residuals the 
coefficient of the lagged residuals is equal to -0.5.  In all three cases, the null hypothesis of no 
serial correlation was rejected.  A fixed effects model assumes that error components within a 
group (or country in the current case) are equally-well correlated with every other observation 
within the group (Nichols and Schaffer, 2007).  However, the presence of serial correlation in the 
fixed effects model shows that in this case that assumption is not valid.  Instead, there is 
                                                            
11 Results including pairwise comparisons for full sample and subsamples and comparisons with and without a 




evidence that the errors are clustered, meaning that observations for each exporting country are 
correlated, although they are not correlated across country pairs.  The same is true for the 
importing countries.  Since these groups overlap (one is not contained within another), the errors 
in the current research are subject to non-nested two-way clustering.  The assumptions under a 
model with clustered errors are more relaxed than under the fixed effects model since one still 
assumes that there is no correlation of the error terms across groups, but the errors within each 
group may have any correlation (Nichols and Schaffer, 2007).   
Cluster-robust standard error estimators only converge to their true values as the 
number of clusters approaches infinity, which in practice has been shown to be around 50 
(Nichols and Schaffer, 2007).  In addition, these estimators have been shown to be less accurate 
in cases when the cluster sizes are unequal.  Both of these issues pose difficulties in the current 
study where there are 25 countries (hence 25 clusters) and some countries have more complete 
time series than others.  Therefore, it is quite possible that cluster-robust standard error estimates 
are less accurate than those produced by the model that does not account for serial correlation.   
To evaluate how cluster-robust standard errors perform in a setting similar to our 
own, we turn to a paper by Cameron et al. (2006).  In it, the authors evaluate a method of 
estimating cluster-robust standard errors in the presence of multi-level clustering by comparing 
its hypothesis test rejection rates with those of other estimation methods for different numbers of 
clusters.  The results most relevant to the current research are those produced for a model with 
random effects common to each group and a heteroskedastic error term where the number of 
two-way clusters is equal to 30.  Although this analysis is not perfectly analogous to the current 
research, it sheds some light on the appropriateness of using this type of estimation procedure.  
The authors find the most accurate rejection rates for the estimation models that assume 
independently and identically distributed errors (no serial correlation) or that allow for only one-
way clustered errors. This result implies that the standard errors produced by a two-way cluster-
robust model would be further from their true values than if the clustered errors are ignored.  





V.  Results 
 Estimates with tax ratios included singly and together appear in Table 5. Subsequent 
tables include all three tax ratios. Tables 6 reports estimates for subsamples and Table 7 lists 
countries included in each subsample. Tables 8 and 9 report estimates for variations of the base 
specification.   
Most of the coefficients of the explanatory variables have the hypothesized signs. 
Real GDP for both the source and destination country have consistently positive signs as 
expected, although generally only the coefficient of the GDP of the destination country is 
significant.  In most specifications tested, the price level of the destination country has a 
statistically significant negative impact, indicating that countries with rising prices are less likely 
to attract FDI.  This result is consistent with the findings of Stein and Daude (2001) who showed 
that inflation in the destination country decreases FDI flows.  The real exchange rate has no 
statistically significant impact on FDI flows, which is similar to results found by Brouwer et al. 
(2008). The business cycle of the home country has a positive effect on outflows of FDI in most 
cases whereas the business cycle of the destination country generally has an insignificant effect 
on FDI flows. Two exceptions occur in subsamples, where the balanced panel regression shows a 
significant positive effect whereas the Pacific Rim shows a significant negative effect of the 
destination country’s business cycle on FDI outflows.  This finding is consistent with mixed 
results found by Frenkel et al. (2004). Common membership in the EU and NAFTA was shown 
to increase FDI outflows, which is consistent with the findings of Frankel and Wei (1996).  The 
dummy variables for WTO and EFTA membership do not appear in the results because 
membership does not vary across the time and mix of countries included in the dataset, which 
was constrained by the availability of bilateral FDI data.    
In our discussion below, the cumulative impact of tax changes on FDI refers to the 
sum of the coefficients of the lagged tax variables from one to eight years (∑       
 




statistical significance is determined by a test of joint significance on those lags. The coefficients 
are semi-elasticities, i.e., the percentage change in outflows of FDI with respect to a one 
percentage point change in the difference between the source and destination countries’ taxes.  
To illustrate, the coefficient of the capital income tax ratio differential lagged one year is 0.024 
and the long-run coefficient is 0.050 (column 4 of Table 4).  If a country increases its average 
effective capital income tax by one percentage point while its trading partners keep its capital 
income taxes constant, the result will be an increase in FDI outflows of 2.4 percent in the current 
year and a cumulative increase in FDI outflows of 5 percent over the eight year period. To put 
this into perspective using the example of the US, which had total FDI outflows of $224 billion 
in 2006, assuming a US capital income tax ratio that is increased from 27 to 28 percent, US FDI 
outflows would increase by 0.024 X $224 billion, or $5.4 billion in the year of the tax increase. 
Over an eight year period, an estimate of the increase in FDI outflows would be 0.05 X $224 
billion, or $11.2 billion. Below we discuss the estimated impact of each type of tax.   
Capital Income Tax 
The capital income tax has a statistically significant positive effect on outflows of 
FDI in all regressions, confirming the results of numerous prior studies.  Significant coefficients 
occur in the lags of the first four years. Table 5 shows that the cumulative effect is 0.026 when 
the capital income tax is included alone. However, the cumulative effect appears higher, at 
0.050, when the effects of labor income and consumption tax changes are included. The 
magnitudes of our estimated semi-elasticities are similar to the average semi-elasticity of .033 
cited in the survey by de Mooij and Ederveen (2008) and Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2001) who found 
.042 using the corporate tax rate differential.  Table 6 shows estimates for subsamples; these 
include FDI flows to other members of the same subsample. Subsample members are listed in 
Table 7.  The estimated semi-elasticities for FDI flows between countries in the subsamples are 
higher: for the European subsample it is .067 and for the Pacific Rim subsample it is .096.  The 
conclusion that changes in capital income tax rates have a significant positive impact on FDI 




Labor Income Tax   
The effect of changes in the labor income tax rate differential is more ambiguous, as 
theory suggests. There appears to be a significant positive effect on outflows after a lag of six 
years, possibly reflecting low labor supply elasticity in the short run that initially keeps wage 
increases in check. Overall, the cumulative effect is significantly negative when controlling for 
the impact of the other taxes.  This would seem to indicate that the dominant impact of 
increasing labor income taxes is to reduce FDI outflows, possibly because firms are spending 
funds to substitute capital for labor domestically; a more definitive answer awaits further 
research. This result is consistent across subsamples and alternative specifications.  The effect is 
stronger for the Pacific Rim subsample, possibly reflecting less rigid labor markets in these 
countries relative to European labor markets.  
Consumption Tax 
Estimates of the impact of changes in the consumption tax rate differential do not 
consistently show a significant impact on FDI outflows. Estimates of the cumulative effect of 
changes in consumption tax are likewise insignificant. We conclude that consumption taxes do 
not affect FDI outflows.  
 
VI.  Conclusions 
Our study finds that higher capital income taxes encourage international investment 
outflow from high-tax countries to low-tax countries, as in previous studies. Our estimate of the 
impact of capital income tax changes is higher than previous studies when changes in labor 
income taxes and consumption taxes are controlled for. Additionally, we estimate the impact of 
capital income tax changes to be much higher in a subsample of Pacific Rim countries.  
We find that higher labor income taxes reduce international investment outflow from 
high-tax countries. We conjecture that this is because the incentive to replace labor with capital 




effect appears to outweigh the incentive to outsource operations abroad. This is a hypothesis that 
remains to be investigated further. We find that consumption taxes, which might also be viewed 
as taxes on work effort, have little impact on international investment flows. 
This paper answers a question raised in Beck and Chaves (2010) which estimated the 
impact of changes in these three taxes: capital income, labor income and consumption, on 
exports.  The question there was: do tax increases induce increases in investment outflow that 
mask their impact on export competitiveness? We conclude that the effect of increases in capital 
income taxes on exports is indeed offset by investment outflows whereas the effect of increases 
in labor income taxes or consumption taxes on exports is not.  
Governments that establish relatively high capital income taxes will drive more 
investment abroad and attract less international investment.  This evidence adds even more 
support to the idea that when reforming tax policies, there is good reason for governments to take 
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Table 1  Descriptive Statistics for the Consumption Tax Ratios 
 
Observations Years  Spanned  Mean  Minimum Median Maximum
Standard 
Deviation 
Australia 37  1970-2006  12.69  10.79  12.48  14.96  1.05 
Austria 37  1970-2006  19.35  18.01  19.27  21.15  0.73 
Belgium 37  1970-2006  18.97  16.23  17.57  33.48  3.80 
Canada 37  1970-2006  15.18  12.87  15.30  18.39  1.44 
Czech Republic  14  1993-2006  17.31  16.06  17.27  19.08  1.13 
Denmark 36  1971-2006  25.50  20.50  25.36  28.00  2.03 
Finland 37  1970-2006  22.38  19.55  22.58  25.38  1.41 
France 37  1970-2006  17.91  16.13  18.05  20.44  1.09 
Germany 37  1970-2006  14.43  13.42  14.36  15.96  0.64 
Greece 37  1970-2006  13.93  11.88  13.85  16.13  1.05 
Hungary 16  1991-2006  23.33  21.31  23.02  25.54  1.22 
Ireland 37  1970-2006  20.21  16.22  21.08  22.88  1.85 
Italy 37  1970-2006  14.30  11.30  14.93  16.81  1.68 
Japan 37  1970-2006  7.02  6.13  6.72  8.30  0.65 
Korea 35  1972-2006  14.46  9.33  14.57  16.93  1.73 
Netherlands 37  1970-2006  17.33  16.00  17.28  19.21  0.82 
New Zealand  21  1986-2006  17.96  13.85  18.12  19.79  1.13 
Norway 37  1970-2006  24.73  22.26  24.49  26.93  1.31 
Poland 12  1995-2006  17.09  15.51  17.09  18.58  0.93 
Portugal 30  1977-2006  16.78  12.20  17.76  19.18  2.07 
Spain 37  1970-2006  11.53  6.58  13.62  15.33  3.43 
Sweden 37  1970-2006  19.84  16.53  20.55  21.96  1.50 
Switzerland 37  1970-2006  9.15  8.02  9.03  10.47  0.68 
UK 37  1970-2006  15.37  12.63  15.47  20.55  1.57 






Table 2  Descriptive Statistics for the Labor Income Tax Ratios 
 
Observations Years  Spanned  Mean  Minimum  Median  Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 
Australia 37  1970-2006  19.44  12.17  20.15  23.05  2.60 
Austria 37  1970-2006  37.15  30.28  36.94  42.28  3.75 
Belgium 37  1970-2006  39.94  30.51  41.64  44.05  3.71 
Canada 37  1970-2006  25.47  19.93  26.75  30.22  3.70 
Czech Republic  14  1993-2006  39.03  38.24  39.02  39.70  0.42 
Denmark 26  1981-2006  38.85  35.41  39.70  41.92  2.16 
Finland 37  1970-2006  38.58  26.04  38.79  49.47  6.47 
France 37  1970-2006  36.52  27.95  39.00  40.26  4.29 
Germany 37  1970-2006  35.13  29.39  35.60  37.27  1.72 
Greece 12  1995-2006  31.34  28.42  31.80  33.22  1.53 
Hungary 16  1991-2006  38.23  35.42  38.06  41.67  1.80 
Ireland 32  1975-2006  23.90  15.70  25.25  28.38  3.32 
Italy 37  1970-2006  32.12  13.54  33.93  42.17  7.70 
Japan 37  1970-2006  21.25  15.52  22.39  25.23  2.83 
Korea 32  1975-2006  7.59  2.02  8.26  15.17  4.00 
Netherlands 37  1980-2006  36.83  30.42  36.77  42.60  3.97 
New Zealand  21  1986-2006  24.85  21.98  24.48  28.67  1.81 
Norway 32  1975-2006  35.89  33.73  36.04  38.01  1.10 
Poland 15  1992-2006  9.69  6.16  10.22  12.51  2.07 
Portugal 12  1995-2006  26.98  25.41  27.12  28.48  1.04 
Spain 37  1970-2006  26.51  14.91  28.39  31.22  4.85 
Sweden 37  1970-2006  46.30  34.81  47.15  52.48  4.56 
Switzerland 37  1970-2006  21.87  15.08  22.70  28.38  2.50 
UK 32  1970-2006  23.62  21.70  23.57  25.94  1.22 





Table 3  Descriptive Statistics for the Capital Income Tax Ratios 
 
Observations Years  Spanned  Mean  Minimum Median  Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 
Australia 37  1970-2006  29.65  22.17  30.55  32.70  2.80 
Austria 37  1970-2006  49.32  44.43  49.59  53.38  2.86 
Belgium 37  1970-2006  51.46  48.33  51.92  53.78  1.38 
Canada 37  1970-2006  36.82  32.27  37.56  39.81  2.35 
Czech Republic  14  1993-2006  49.59  48.77  49.33  50.83  0.70 
Denmark 26  1981-2006  55.00  51.19  55.78  58.03  2.16 
Finland 37  1970-2006  52.27  41.48  53.97  61.08  5.63 
France 37  1970-2006  47.92  42.08  49.36  51.16  3.00 
Germany 37  1970-2006  44.49  40.66  44.59  46.70  1.34 
Greece 12  1995-2006  41.12  38.74  41.12  42.55  1.22 
Hungary 16  1991-2006  52.64  50.38  52.86  54.99  1.59 
Ireland 32  1975-2006  39.47  29.93  41.14  44.19  3.94 
Italy 37  1970-2006  41.76  25.94  43.79  51.24  7.30 
Japan 37  1970-2006  26.78  21.60  27.67  30.94  2.63 
Korea 32  1975-2006  21.37  13.99  21.68  26.39  3.03 
Netherlands 37  1980-2006  47.79  42.65  47.53  52.63  3.11 
New Zealand  21  1986-2006  38.35  35.59  37.95  41.01  1.63 
Norway 32  1975-2006  51.88  49.73  51.76  54.13  1.08 
Poland 12  1995-2006  24.63  21.82  24.50  27.62  1.82 
Portugal 12  1995-2006  40.31  38.67  40.23  42.20  1.05 
Spain 37  1970-2006  34.86  22.16  38.46  41.56  6.48 
Sweden 37  1970-2006  56.91  46.43  57.71  62.25  4.21 
Switzerland 37  1970-2006  29.02  22.99  29.59  34.54  2.31 
UK 32  1970-2006  35.55  33.91  35.26  41.16  1.55 




Table 4  Choice of Model Specification 
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Number of Observations  6,362  6,362  6,362  6025 
Adj. R-Squared  0.819  0.633  0.698    
Root Mean Square Error  1.135  1.621  1.471    
Akaike Information Criterion  20,914.92  24,285.63  23,047.27    
Bayesian Information 
Criterion  25,253.61  24,846.55  23,635.22    
Hausman FE vs. RE χ2(44)  177.37***          
Hausman Overidentification 
Test  χ2(6)           31.018*** 
Wald tests: 
Exporter Effect  41.75***  11.88***  22.04***    
Importer Effect  9.53***  3.27**  8.43***    
Time Effect  8.81***  4.61***  5.49***    
Bilateral Effect        294.64***    
Estimation: 
Constant  -12.187  -5.185  -14.211  -69.577*** 
ln GDPit-1  0.759* 0.298  0.825*  2.586*** 
ln GDPjt-1  0.562*  0.801*  1.009***  1.609*** 
ln PPIit-1  0.523* -0.179  0.062  0.480*** 
ln PPIjt-1  0.108  0.040  0.171*  0.036 
ln Eijt-1  -0.046 -0.261  -0.176  0.016 
Language        -0.730***  1.626* 
Adjacency        -14.211  1.359** 
Distance        0.846*** 
EUijt-1  0.382***  1.006*** 0.406*** 0.647*** 
WTOijt-1  0.148  0.379  -0.041  1.107*** 
NAFTAijt-1  0.215 1.226***  -1.568***  0.136 
EFTAijt-1        0.648***  3.475 
lnBCit-1  4.427***  3.531*** 3.902*** 3.626*** 
lnBCjt-1  1.392***  0.383  0.577  0.725* 
 





Table 5  Impact of Various Taxes on Foreign Direct Investment 
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Tax Ratio  
(3) 
All Tax Ratios  
(4) 
ln GDPit-1  0.5249  0.7067  0.4122  0.2036 
ln GDPjt-1  0.7511*  0.9645**  1.0116**  1.0005** 
ln PPIit-1  0.3515  0.3269  0.1232  -0.0276 
ln PPIjt-1  -0.8433*  -0.9840**  -0.9060**  -0.8925* 
ln Eijt-1  0.1053  -0.1150  0.0933  0.0049 
EUijt-1  0.3434***  0.4419***  0.4055***  0.3668*** 
NAFTAijt-1  0.3330***  0.3884***  0.4016***  0.3950*** 
lnBCit-1  4.7467***  4.7813***  4.2363***  4.0782*** 
lnBCjt-1  0.8331  0.3056  0.3197  0.5384 
TCit-1-TCjt-1  -0.0010        0.0227 
TCit-2-TCjt-2  0.0193        0.0024 
TCit-3-TCjt-3  0.0171        -0.0029 
TCit-4-TCjt-4  -0.0225        -0.0258 
TCit-5-TCjt-5  0.0330        0.0349 
TCit-6-TCjt-6  -0.0065        -0.0107 
TCit-7-TCjt-7  -0.0286        -0.0406* 
TCit-8-TCjt-8  0.0299*        0.0316 
TCi-TCj Cumulative
1  0.0407  0.0116 
TLit-1-TLjt-1     0.0053     0.0044 
TLit-2-TLjt-2     -0.0077     -0.0139 
TLit-3-TLjt-3     -0.0009     -0.0079 
TLit-4-TLjt-4     0.0048     -0.0053 
TLit-5-TLjt-5     -0.0183     -0.0177 
TLit-6-TLjt-6     0.0324**     0.0360** 
TLit-7-TLjt-7     -0.0205     -0.0232* 
TLit-8-TLjt-8     -0.0112     -0.0170 
TLi-TLj Cumulative
1  -0.0161  -0.0446*** 
TKit-1-TKjt-1        0.0186**  0.0241** 
TKit-2-TKjt-2        0.0056  0.0090 
TKit-3-TKjt-3        -0.0126  -0.0088 
TKit-4-TKjt-4        0.0220**  0.0218** 
TKit-5-TKjt-5        0.0033  0.0065 
TKit-6-TKjt-6        -0.0130  -0.0119 
TKit-7-TKjt-7        -0.0040  0.0004 
TKit-8-TKjt-8        0.0062  0.0093 
TKi-TKj Cumulative
1  0.0261***  0.0504*** 
Sample Size  5,510 5,129  5,033  4,970 
Country Pairs  549 545  545  545 
R-Squared  0.2733 0.2665 0.2700 0.2810 
RMSE  1.122 1.107 1.100 1.084 




Table 6  Subsample Estimates of the Impact of Taxes on FDI Outflows 
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ln GDPit-1  0.2036  0.8262  3.1662**  2.9410 
ln GDPjt-1  1.0005**  -0.8395  0.5019  7.6318* 
ln PPIit-1  -0.0276  0.1475  -0.2278  -1.0414 
ln PPIjt-1  -0.8925*  -1.1937**  -1.6354**  1.2192 
ln Eijt-1  0.0049  -0.2656  -0.3871  -0.6804 
EUijt-1  0.3668*** 0.2375*  0.1092 
NAFTAijt-1  0.3950*** 0.4037***  0.8284*** 
lnBCit-1  4.0782*** 3.3026***  0.6465  4.9943 
lnBCjt-1  0.5384  4.0095***  1.2557  -7.4107** 
TCit-1-TCjt-1  0.0227  0.0274 0.0053 0.1701 
TCit-2-TCjt-2  0.0024  -0.0280 -0.0140 -0.2424 
TCit-3-TCjt-3  -0.0029 0.0366  0.0211  -0.1065 
TCit-4-TCjt-4  -0.0258 -0.0193 0.0130 0.4337* 
TCit-5-TCjt-5  0.0349 0.0314  0.0360  -0.0545 
TCit-6-TCjt-6  -0.0107  -0.0240 -0.0646 -0.0274 
TCit-7-TCjt-7  -0.0406* -0.0521**  -0.0209 -0.1136 
TCit-8-TCjt-8  0.0316  0.0293 0.0308 0.0190 
TCi-TCj Cumulative
1  0.0116  0.00125  0.00689  0.0785* 
TLit-1-TLjt-1  0.0044 -0.0115 0.0010  -0.2582*** 
TLit-2-TLjt-2  -0.0139  0.0075 0.0013 0.1444 
TLit-3-TLjt-3  -0.0079  -0.0003 -0.0033 -0.0499 
TLit-4-TLjt-4  -0.0053 -0.0105  -0.0114 0.0524 
TLit-5-TLjt-5  -0.0177  -0.0072 -0.0205 -0.1684* 
TLit-6-TLjt-6  0.0360** 0.0229  0.0380* 0.1251* 
TLit-7-TLjt-7  -0.0232*  -0.0405** -0.0470** -0.2419 
TLit-8-TLjt-8  -0.0170 -0.0020  -0.0151 0.2915** 
TLi-TLj Cumulative
1  -0.0446*** -0.0416**  -0.0569***  -0.1050** 
TKit-1-TKjt-1  0.0241**  0.0431*** 0.0355*** 0.0976*** 
TKit-2-TKjt-2  0.0090 0.0005  0.0100  -0.0051 
TKit-3-TKjt-3  -0.0088  -0.0103 -0.0124 -0.0119 
TKit-4-TKjt-4  0.0218** 0.0227* 0.0189  0.0185 
TKit-5-TKjt-5  0.0065 -0.0108  -0.0124 0.0205 
TKit-6-TKjt-6  -0.0119  0.0006 0.0056 0.0381 
TKit-7-TKjt-7  0.0004 -0.0050 0.0034  -0.0486 
TKit-8-TKjt-8  0.0093 0.0234**  0.0173  -0.0129 
TKi-TKj Cumulative
1  0.0504*** 0.0642***  0.0658**  0.0963*** 
Sample Size  4,970 3,440 1,970 205 
Country Pairs  545 256 155  11 
R-Squared  0.2810  0.3310 0.3889 0.6315 
RMSE  1.084  1.048 1.062 0.716 




Table 7  Subsample Composition 
Subsamples  Countries Included  Countries Dropped 
  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, United States. 
 
  





Australia, Austria, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom, United States 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, 
Hungary, New Zealand, Poland, 
Portugal. 




Europe (13 countries) 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom.   
Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Japan, 





Pacific Rim (5 countries) 
Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, and 
U.S.   
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,  
Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 






Table 8  Results after Dropping Price and Exchange Rate Variables 
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Real Exchange Rate 
& PPI excluded 
(3) 
ln GDPit-1        0.1991  0.2035              0.3535 
ln GDPjt-1   0.8045*  1.0011**   0.7724* 
ln PPIit-1           -0.0273 
ln PPIjt-1  -0.8932* 
ln Eijt-1  0.0542 
EUijt-1  0.3568***  0.3668***  0.3678*** 
NAFTAijt-1  0.3601***  0.3951***  0.3560*** 
lnBCit-1  4.0868***  4.0797***  3.9666*** 
lnBCjt-1  0.5874  0.5366  0.5948 
TCit-1-TCjt-1  0.0210 0.0226 0.0163 
TCit-2-TCjt-2  0.0011 0.0024  -0.0015 
TCit-3-TCjt-3  -0.0041 -0.0028 -0.0094 
TCit-4-TCjt-4  -0.0272 -0.0258 -0.0200 
TCit-5-TCjt-5  0.0352 0.0349 0.0312 
TCit-6-TCjt-6  -0.0063 -0.0107 -0.0064 
TCit-7-TCjt-7    -0.0402*   -0.0406*  -0.0368 
TCit-8-TCjt-8    0.0321 0.0316 0.0341* 
TCi-TCj Cumulative
1   0.0116  0.0116  0.0075 
TLit-1-TLjt-1    0.0063 0.0044 0.0046 
TLit-2-TLjt-2  -0.0146            -0.0139  -0.0118 
TLit-3-TLjt-3  -0.0090            -0.0079  -0.0084 
TLit-4-TLjt-4  -0.0054            -0.0053  -0.0059 
TLit-5-TLjt-5  -0.0177            -0.0177  -0.0202 
TLit-6-TLjt-6              0.0374***             0.0359**  0.0387*** 
TLit-7-TLjt-7             -0.0228*            -0.0232*  -0.0223* 
TLit-8-TLjt-8   -0.0182            -0.0170  -0.0183 
TLi-TLj Cumulative
1  -0.0440***  -0.0447***  -0.0436*** 
TKit-1-TKjt-1  0.0249*** 0.0241**  0.0246*** 
TKit-2-TKjt-2   0.0094             0.0089              0.0095 
TKit-3-TKjt-3  -0.0086            -0.0088             -0.0074 
TKit-4-TKjt-4  0.0215**             0.0218**       0.0209** 
TKit-5-TKjt-5   0.0058             0.0065   0.0044 
TKit-6-TKjt-6  -0.0117            -0.0119  -0.0110 
TKit-7-TKjt-7   0.0008             0.0004  0.0008 
TKit-8-TKjt-8   0.0106             0.0093   0.0105 
TKi-TKj Cumulative
1  0.0527***  0.0503***  0.0523*** 
Sample Size  4,970 4,970  5,076 
Country Pairs  545 545  545 
R-Squared  0.2796 0.2810 0.2907 





Table 9   Results Using Population and Real GDP per Capita 
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Dependent Variable  ln FDIijt 
Real GDP 
(1) 
Real GDP per capita 
(2) 
Real GDP & Population 
(3)  
ln GDPit-1  0.2036   0.5283  0.2744 
ln GDPjt-1  1.0005**  1.3485***  1.0931** 
ln Population it-1  -0.0000 
ln Population jt-1  -0.0000*** 
ln PPIit-1       -0.0276  -0.0899  -0.0180 
ln PPIjt-1        -0.8925*  -0.9283**  -0.8706* 
ln Eijt-1         0.0049  -0.0051  -0.0064 
EUijt-1   0.3668***  0.3507***  0.3262*** 
NAFTAijt-1   0.3950***  0.5015***  0.6282*** 
lnBCit-1   4.0782***  4.0879***  4.1237*** 
lnBCjt-1         0.5384  0.3613  0.4055 
TCit-1-TCjt-1         0.0227  0.0231  0.0246 
TCit-2-TCjt-2         0.0024  0.0026  0.0023 
TCit-3-TCjt-3        -0.0029  -0.0038  -0.0053 
TCit-4-TCjt-4        -0.0258  -0.0242  -0.0223 
TCit-5-TCjt-5         0.0349  0.0357  0.0341 
TCit-6-TCjt-6        -0.0107  -0.0084  -0.0091 
TCit-7-TCjt-7  -0.0406* -0.0392*  -0.0399* 
TCit-8-TCjt-8  0.0316 0.0334* 0.0325 
TCi-TCj Cumulative
1  0.0116  0.0192  0.0169 
TLit-1-TLjt-1  0.0044 0.0050  0.0051 
TLit-2-TLjt-2        -0.0139  -0.0143  -0.0148 
TLit-3-TLjt-3        -0.0079  -0.0077  -0.0074 
TLit-4-TLjt-4        -0.0053  -0.0051  -0.0050 
TLit-5-TLjt-5        -0.0177  -0.0180  -0.0192 
TLit-6-TLjt-6    0.0360**  0.0366***  0.0365*** 
TLit-7-TLjt-7  -0.0232* -0.0227*  -0.0228* 
TLit-8-TLjt-8        -0.0170  -0.0158  -0.0155 
TLi-TLj Cumulative
1   -0.0446***  -0.0420***  -0.0431*** 
TKit-1-TKjt-1  0.0241** 0.0233**  0.0248*** 
TKit-2-TKjt-2         0.0090  0.0089  0.0087 
TKit-3-TKjt-3        -0.0088  -0.0091  -0.0091 
TKit-4-TKjt-4    0.0218**  0.0213**  0.0217** 
TKit-5-TKjt-5         0.0065  0.0065  0.0058 
TKit-6-TKjt-6        -0.0119  -0.0125  -0.0123 
TKit-7-TKjt-7         0.0004             0.0003  0.0002 
TKit-8-TKjt-8         0.0093             0.0088  0.0100 
TKi-TKj Cumulative
1  0.0504***  0.0475***  0.0498*** 
Sample Size  4,970 4,970  4,970 
Country Pairs  545 545  545 
R-Squared  0.2810 0.2826  0.2835 
RMSE          1.084  1.083  1.083 
* = 10%, ** = 5%, ***=1% significance level. Cumulative = sum of prior 8 lags with F-test of joint significance. 